The non-governmental analytical center «Ukrainian Studies of Strategic Disquisitions» is conducting a long-term project on monitoring regional processes in the Russian Federation.
The aim of the study is to identify and document the dynamics of conflict-generating and disintegration factors that will contribute to the deconstruction of the Russian Federation and its disappearance as a geopolitical reality.
The object of the monitoring is the information field of the Russian Federation. The analysis includes the most popular news from various regions of Russia on a monthly basis, providing a clearer understanding of the internal processes taking place in the aggressor state and enabling the monitoring of conflict-generating regional processes.
The project is conducted in partnership with the initiative «Anti-Imperial Bloc of Peoples» and the public organization «Ukrainian Student.»
Monitoring is carried out based on six main qualitative parameters, considered in the context of their impact on strengthening or weakening central power. These parameters are:
- Socio-political: Local politicians, «varangians» (outsiders), political institutions, clans, processes, etc.
- Socio-economic: Inter-budgetary relations, business activity, control over assets and cash flows, etc.
- Humanitarian: Language, culture, education, film production, etc. Statements from authorities, intellectuals, and activists regarding historical and cultural issues.
- Religious: Separation of church and state, participation in state propaganda/counter-propaganda, influence on political and cultural processes.
- National: Status of indigenous peoples, their influence on regional situations, liberation struggles.
- Environmental: Environmental pollution and the protests it causes.
- Military: Impact of war and mobilization on the socio-political situation.
Monitoring Conflict-Generating and Disintegration Factors in the Russian Federation
First Half of 2024
The most significant impact on processes in Russia in the first half of 2024 is exerted by Russia’s aggressive war against Ukraine (the so-called Special Military Operation), the country’s shift to a wartime economy, and the curtailment of civil and national rights. The main conflict-generating societal events in Russia during this period were the January protests in Bashkortostan, large-scale environmental disasters in the spring, particularly floods in the Orenburg and Kurgan regions, and major fires.
The situation in Russia continues to gradually deteriorate, with the central government losing control over the situation, although it maintains information censorship in the country and retains coercive tools of influence.
A significant nationwide event was the so-called Putin elections in March 2024, which led to a «reboot of power» at the federal and regional levels, including government changes and the dismissal of some regional heads. Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu was removed from his position and appointed as Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation (replacing Nikolai Patrushev Sr.). This dismissal is likely a punishment for the unsuccessful conduct of the war. Former Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs Andrey Belousov, who is associated with Putin’s close associates Kiriyenko and the Kovalchuks, has been proposed for the head of the military department.
In the Russian-style regime, the significance of institutions depends on the connections of their leaders with Putin. As a result, the Security Council loses its role and becomes an honorary pension to which S. Shoigu has been sent. At the same time, his key deputies have been arrested — first Shoigu’s deputy Timur Ivanov, and then the head of the Main Directorate of Personnel of the Ministry of Defense, Yuri Kuznetsov.
Among those close to the Kremlin dictator is Nikolai Patrushev Sr., whose role has been slightly weakened, but it is clear that Putin still considers him important, as he has been appointed an advisor in the administration, and his son Dmitry has become a Deputy Prime Minister.
The most important thing is that, except for S. Shoigu, all the heads of the security agencies remain in their positions — Alexander Bortnikov (head of the FSB), Vladimir Zolotov (head of the National Guard), and Sergey Naryshkin (head of the Foreign Intelligence Service). It is worth noting that Bortnikov and Zolotov are creations of Patrushev, while Andrey Belousov and Valery Gerasimov act as their counterbalance. Most likely, Putin will try to work through them, directly managing the course of the war.
The main fact is that despite various insider reports, the head of the government, Mikhail Mishustin, has not changed. He began as an inconspicuous technocrat and still minimizes radical statements on foreign policy, presenting himself as an «effective manager.» There is increasing evidence that Beijing supports him as Putin’s successor, and he is forced to heed the opinion of the senior brother. It is no coincidence that the new old government was appointed before Putin’s visit to China on May 16-17.
Another trend visible in the news is that the Russian regime is facing the inability to wage war without general mobilization, leading to massive recruitment of mercenaries from Africa and Asia. Additionally, in June, several regions significantly increased payments from local budgets to support «volunteers.» However, the authorities fear full mobilization and the mass protests that could follow.
Economic problems are also escalating, exacerbated by Western sanctions. After sanctions were imposed on June 13, stock trading in dollars and euros in Russia was suspended. The Russian ruble ceased to be a freely convertible currency. The US Treasury Department also announced it is ready to impose any sanctions on foreign banks for transactions with Russian financial organizations, including Sberbank and VTB. Simultaneously, new IT sector sanctions were introduced. From September 12, the export, sale, supply of IT consulting and design services, IT support, and cloud sectors for software to any person in Russia from the US and through third countries is prohibited.
According to traditional parameters, the Russian economy is in excellent shape. However, Putin and his associates have distorted its structure towards the military-industrial complex so much that we can no longer measure its state like other countries. Kremlin propagandists happily point out that their GDP is growing faster than in many EU countries. However, they fail to mention that Russia currently has unprecedented capital movement restrictions, the government’s role in economic processes has unnaturally increased, and Moscow’s trade relations with the outside world have undergone a radical reorientation from the West to the Southeast over two years.
While Russia does not yet have a planned economy regime typical of the USSR before its collapse, the aggressor country is no longer a state with a market economy. The system currently existing in Moscow is called «dirigism,» characterized by active state intervention in all economic processes.
The Moscow government implements its strategy through repressive methods, placing business and population interests below military needs. At the same time, the minimal welfare of ordinary citizens remains an important part of Kremlin policy. In his pre-election statements, Putin promised state programs worth trillions of rubles to his voters. However, these promises are likely to remain unfulfilled: these trillions will be spent on «funeral payments» and repairing oil refineries damaged by Ukrainian drones, not on the welfare of residents of the dark Russian village.
After two years of great war, the basic scenario for Moscow has become long-term armed confrontation. The Kremlin does not believe in the possibility of defeat, but it also does not hope for the lifting of sanctions and a return to global trade. The recent restrictions on the Moscow Stock Exchange, although extremely painful, did not come as a surprise to Moscow; the government has been preparing for them for a long time.
The future of the Russian economy depends on whether the Kremlin can find sources of funding for the rapidly growing military expenses. The increase in budget expenditures is planned to be covered by revenues from energy sales, but it is unclear whether these revenues will be realized. The source for covering the deficit is the National Wealth Fund, which is rapidly depleting: the value of its liquid assets has decreased from 9 trillion rubles at the beginning of 2022 to 5 trillion at the beginning of 2024.
REGIONS
A) Caucasus
Rostov Oblast
The media reports minimal information regarding subversive activities — attempts at sabotage on the region’s energy systems and lack of support for Russian military personnel. The motivation and reasons for such actions are of interest. The region is close to the Ukrainian border, and consequently, the effects of the war are felt more intensely here.
Kuban (Karachay-Cherkess Republic, Krasnodar Krai, Republic of Adygea, Stavropol Krai)
Cossack Revival
In Krasnodar Krai, there is an active process of developing the «Kuban Cossack Army,» which covers all important spheres of life in the region, from preschool education to the participation of «KKA» units in the «SVO.» This happens with active support from the regional administration. The issue is directly overseen by the ataman of the «KKA,» Alexander Vlasov, who also holds the position of deputy governor of the krai.
Protest and Anti-System Actions
The only form of protest in Kuban that does not overly irritate the regime is environmental actions supported by the court opposition. More than 150 people participated in a rally against a landfill that the authorities plan to set up near the village of Sovietskaya, according to the organizers. «There was a lot of police. The rally went well and was organized. About ten residents of the village, representatives of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) and Yabloko parties, and environmentalists spoke at the rally,» commented Albina Maschenko, leader of the public organization «Gates of the Caucasus.» Additionally, a criminal case was initiated against a 16-year-old teenager from Stavropol for calls to terrorism (part 1 of article 205.2 of the Criminal Code) due to anti-war leaflets. «More than 400 people died in the village of Bucha as a result of war crimes committed by the Russian Armed Forces. This is not liberation; this is genocide,» read the leaflets he allegedly posted on the night of April 3-4. They also featured a photo of a destroyed building, the words «Freedom for Russia,» and a link to the «Freedom for Russia» Legion’s Telegram channel.
Karachay-Balkar Republic
In Karachay-Cherkessia, when there is talk of «friendship between peoples» on an official level, it usually means that somewhere a «fire» needs to be extinguished. This time it happened following two armed attacks by local military-political opposition fighters on Russian policemen near Karachayevsk. A rebel unit consisting of Karachays and a Slav who converted to Islam inflicted losses on the security forces but was destroyed in the battle. This event caused significant resonance in the republic and sparked lively discussions and evaluations.
An important agent of the colonial administration in Karachay-Cherkessia is Islamic religious institutions. A very influential figure among the local elites is the head of the Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Karachay-Cherkessia, Ismail-Haji Berdiev, a Karachay, who has also headed the Coordinating Center of Muslims of the North Caucasus since 2003.
Kabardino-Adyghe-Circassian
The occupiers neutralized a fairly large group consisting of local residents. This indicates the potential for anti-system movements among local communities. The security forces blocked 12 «militants» in a garden association in Nalchik, killing several of them. The «militants» who were eliminated by special services in the suburbs of Nalchik turned out to be residents of Kabardino-Balkaria. Authorities acknowledge that the main threat is the activities of armed resistance groups formed on religious and national grounds.
On April 22, there was an attack on a police patrol in Karachayevsk. One of the attackers, Ruslan Semenov, is on the list of extremists and terrorists. This allows the event to be classified not as criminal actions, but as an activity of the military-political opposition in KCR.
Chechnya
On April 22, news emerged that Ramzan Kadyrov was critically ill. These rumors are not new, as reports of his illness appeared as early as 2019. The nature and tone of the reports, combined with surveys of people, suggest that Kadyrov is suffering from terminal pancreonecrosis. However, there is some data indicating that this is not the case. In the event of his death, there is a potential for conflict in Chechnya and shifts within the Russian Federation. Already in May, there are rotations in the Chechen government aimed at strengthening Kadyrov’s immediate relatives. However, most, even the elites, do not accept them. According to rumors, Putin and the FSB favor Major General Apti Alaudinov, commander of the «Akhmat» battalion, who closely collaborates with «ex-Wagnerites.» A notable event in April was the arrest by Dagestani police of the head of the Chechen Ministry of Emergency Situations, Alikhan Tsakayev, for driving under the influence, who was then de facto taken away by Chechen security forces. Later, the head of Dagestan, Sergey Melikov, stated: «The incident that occurred at the Gerzel checkpoint certainly requires the most careful and detailed analysis and, of course, will not affect our fraternal and good-neighborly relations with the Chechen people.»
Ingushetia
On March 12, FSB officers in Ingushetia allegedly found a cache of Ingush Liberation Army fighters who died during a battle on March 2 in Karabulak. The Committee for Ingush Independence confirmed responsibility for the fight with the occupiers.
North Ossetia-Alania
In the spring of 2024, significant political tensions were observed in North Ossetia, related to elections and internal conflicts. Local elections were overshadowed by allegations of fraud, including cases of ballot stuffing and failure to secure voting urns. The United Russia party slightly lost support, decreasing from 64.3% in 2012 to 59.23% in 2024. Conflicts between parties, such as between the Communist Party of the Russian Federation and the Communist Party of Russia, led to mutual accusations and legal suits. Tensions also arose due to the appointment of a health minister from another region, causing mass resignations of medical professionals. In the spring of 2024, Ukrainian drones attacked the military airfield in Mozdok, and on June 8, Russian forces shot down a Ukrainian drone over North Ossetia-Alania, according to the Russian Ministry of Defense. The drone attacks resulted in minor damage and fires in North Ossetia. This incident caused significant concern among the local population, highlighting the region’s importance for Russia’s military operations and the inadequate preparedness of local air defense systems.
Dagestan
A significant news story remains the investigation of illegal actions by the Makhachkala police. On January 21, police officers killed a 35-year-old man during his arrest. Several suspects are under arrest, indicating attempts by authorities to showcase a high level of crackdown on police lawlessness.
Governor Melikov is also demonstrating the protection of local residents’ interests. Following his request, the Federal Agency for Fishery supported the proposal to transfer the property complex of the Arakum and Lower Terek water bodies to the Republic of Dagestan. Meanwhile, the Makhachkala court ordered the city administration to eliminate sewage discharges into the sea.
On March 31, Russian occupiers conducted a «counter-terrorist operation» against the underground resistance in Makhachkala and Kaspiysk. During the arrest, the FSB surrounded a block on Akhmet-Khan Sultan Street, detaining three people allegedly planning an explosion on the embankment or in Victory Park in Kaspiysk (according to the FSB, one of the detainees «confessed» to this). Automatic weapons, ammunition, and a sniper rifle ready for use were found at the arrest site. The occupation administration demonstratively reminds of the danger of radical calls, indicating the spread of discontent.
On May 8, a house belonging to religious figure Ahmad Batlukhsky burned down in the village of Batlukh, Shamilsky district. The fire is linked to the preacher’s rhetoric opposing the pro-government muftis. Valery Fadeev, head of the Human Rights Council under the President of Russia, believes that the country should ban the wearing of niqabs. He plans to discuss this issue with regional authorities and «representatives of traditional Islam», Fadeev said in an interview with «Parliamentary Newspaper». This issue has been criticized by many Muslim bloggers. It is worth noting the deepening of direct economic cooperation with Muslim countries, particularly the UAE. Despite dependence on the Kremlin, local authorities participate in cross-border negotiations (primarily with Azerbaijan). In May, trade agreements were concluded with Oman and Azerbaijan.
Republic of Kalmykia
Kalmykia is one of the most depressed regions in Russia. Ethnic Kalmyks, who are predominantly Buddhists, make up the majority of the population. The results of Putin’s elections indicate a high protest potential, with the Communist candidate receiving over 7% of the vote. Batu Khasikov is fighting for the right to be re-nominated as head of the Republic. Former head of Kalmykia Kirsan Ilyumzhinov occasionally stirs up media information about his possible return to power. The Republic has long-standing independence traditions; its diaspora is part of the League of Free Nations and does not recognize election results. In March, Vladimir Dovdanov, deputy of the Congress of the Oirat-Kalmyk People, was declared wanted.
Kalmykia remains a record-holder for population debt and credit. The Republic leads in the number of crimes involving firearms. It ranks last in Russia for the availability of medical personnel and access to centralized water supply.
B) Idel-Ural
Chuvashia
Negative sentiments regarding mobilization are observed in the region, with the authorities trying to involve the population in the war through intimidation with news about what happens to those who refuse and hide from service. Additionally, the advantages of military service are highlighted, with periodic news about the privileges given to participants in the so-called SVO.
The greatest centrifugal tendencies are observed in the cultural sphere and are covered not only in unofficial news but also in official ones. Various cultural events dedicated to Chuvash traditions and artists are held in the Republic. Artists working abroad dedicate most of their exhibitions and works not only to historical themes but also to resistance against the system.
Republic of Bashkortostan
January was the most active month. The excessively harsh decision of the Baymak district court in Bashkortostan, sentencing well-known local eco-activist and former head of the banned «Bashkort» organization Faik Alishev to 4 years in prison under Article 282 Part 1 of the Russian Criminal Code («Incitement of hatred or enmity and humiliation of human dignity»), sparked mass protests.
On January 17, 2024, the day the verdict was announced, thousands of people gathered outside the court building, as they had the previous day. In response, Russian security forces resorted to mass beatings, the use of tear gas, and the detention of protesters. Later, repressions unfolded against activists. The head of Bashkortostan, Radiy Khabirov, directly accused one of the leaders of the «Bashkort» movement, Ruslan Gabbasov, who is abroad, of inciting the protests. In May-June, significant concern was noted in the Republic regarding Ukrainian drone strikes, particularly on May 9 on the Gazprom Neft Salavat refinery.
Mari El
There were no evident separatist sentiments in the region during the period under study. Instead, actions aimed at strengthening Moscow’s ideology and power took place. The center continues to implement programs aimed at ideological upbringing of children. The region also boasts about improving the economic provision of its residents. The residents of the region are sent to the war in Ukraine. During the elections in several regions of the Volga region, the «Noon Against Putin» actions took place.
Tatarstan
Tatarstan is experiencing tension due to the activities of national and religious movements. The FSB conducts searches and detentions among activists of the Tatar national movement. In May, Russian security forces came with searches to four national movement activists over four days: Rail Sadriev, Engel Fattakhov (former Minister of Education of the Republic), Rafik Karimullin, and Zinnur Agliullin. Fattakhov was arrested. Theater artist Sadriev was banned from performing on stage and communicating with colleagues.
The State Council of Tatarstan has prepared a draft amendment to the Russian Labor Code, allowing teenagers from 16 years old to work in harmful and dangerous industries, to be sent to the State Duma. Students in Elabuga have been working for a year assembling Iranian UAVs.
The activity of extremist organizations, such as the «Russian community,» which held marches in Yekaterinburg with xenophobic slogans, reflects the growth of nationalist sentiments, affecting inter-ethnic relations in the region.
Republic of Mordovia
Part of the population supports the Russian Federation’s plans to reconstruct buildings and roads in various cities. They see themselves as part of the Federation and contribute to state policy: schoolchildren make items for soldiers, and humanitarian aid is collected. People are also massively involved in honoring the victims of the terrorist attack at the «Crocus» center.
C) Siberia and the Far East
Siberia
May Protests:
This month saw significant protests by Russian standards. In Novosibirsk, 200 people protested against animal euthanasia. Another protest, also with 200 participants, took place on May 23rd near Novosibirsk against the construction of the South Siberian Metal Rolling Plant (YUNMZ) in Iskitim, Novosibirsk region. Activists gathered again, but the city administration banned a rally on June 1st to defend the rights of children of mobilized soldiers. Iskitim is one of the cities in Russia with the most polluted air. A petition against the plant gathered 2,600 signatures, but the city mayor accused activists of «hype.»
On May 9th, students and teachers of the agricultural university in Novosibirsk were called to participate in the «Letter to a Hero» and «Letter to a Soldier» campaigns in support of Russia’s war against Ukraine. Shortly afterward, two protests took place in the city demanding the release of political prisoners, including Lev Yashin, Vladimir Kara-Murza, and Sergey Furgal.
Arrests:
In Novosibirsk and the region, there were at least two attempted arson attacks on military enlistment offices in May: one successful in Berdsk, the other unsuccessful in Novosibirsk. Even approving an arson attack on social media led to a fine of 350,000 rubles. The FSB also detained a resident of Birobidzhan for allegedly planning to set fire to a military enlistment office.
After two years, a Novosibirsk court sentenced Ilya Baburin to 25 years in prison for attempting to set fire to a military enlistment office and a music school, a plan revealed in 2022. Baburin became the first person accused of treason for attempting to set fire to a military enlistment office.
Arrests or sentences were also made in May 2024 for arson or sabotage on railways. Three 16-year-old teenagers were arrested for two months in the city of Belovo, Kemerovo region. Another minor from Tomsk was sentenced to 4.5 years for similar actions committed in September 2023. A resident of Novosibirsk, who applied to the Freedom of Russia Legion, was sentenced to 12 years for a similar attempt — on November 4, 2022, Gurulev tried to sabotage the Siberian station of the West Siberian Railway.
Freedom of Speech, Religion, and Conscience:
There have been repeated convictions or arrests based on the lack of freedom of speech regarding support for Ukraine or anti-war statements.
In Omsk, a court sentenced former head of the Omsk branch of the Alliance of Doctors union, Olga Belova, in absentia to six years in a penal colony for a VKontakte post where she expressed anti-war views.
Another pensioner from the Omsk region faces up to 7 years for anti-war posts on Odnoklassniki. She posted a song in Ukrainian, a comment wishing victory to Ukraine, and comments criticizing the policies of the Russian president.
There were also tendencies to arrest clergy members. In Omsk, the parish of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church was liquidated after an icon depicting Stepan Bandera was found, and the pastor, Igor Maksimov, was placed under house arrest.
A man in Angarsk, Irkutsk region, received a 12-year sentence for treason for gathering «information and photographs about the state of an industrial facility and products» for «Ukrainian intelligence.» A similar sentence was handed down to a resident of Priangarie for distributing «Freedom of Russia» leaflets — he received 13 years.
Ecology and Natural Disasters:
Northern Russia regions were plagued by natural disasters in May. Forest fires engulfed Siberia at the beginning of May. On May 6, the first evacuations began in the Omsk region due to rising water levels in the Ishim River, threatening the federal highway Omsk-Tyumen. On May 9, fires in the Irkutsk region began approaching the city of Bratsk. The city of Vikhorevka was evacuated. There were casualties and injuries in the region, with many homes near Bratsk destroyed by fire.
On May 8, high water reached the Tomsk region, flooding 20 settlements. On the same day, gas cylinder explosions were recorded near Krasnoyarsk, spreading the fire over a thousand square meters, with grass arson identified as the cause. In Novosibirsk, a landfill burned for five days.
On May 11, a severe accident occurred in Olekminsk, Yakutia — a boiler exploded, leaving 90 houses without power. In the same area, four villages were flooded. Later, it was revealed that Surgutneftegaz concealed information about an oil spill in Yakutia (which occurred on May 10).
Primorye
Increasing Chinese Influence:
Economic and infrastructure contacts with China are growing. In Guangzhou, a meeting took place between the head of the tourism development department of the regional tourism agency Yulia Korsak and the director of aviation commerce of Vladivostok International Airport Alexander Bobrov with representatives of Guangzhou International Airport, discussing prospects for opening a direct flight between the regions. Primorsky Krai Governor Oleg Kozhemyako stated that the region is actively working to strengthen friendship with the neighboring Chinese province of Heilongjiang. In an interview with Heilongjiang TV, he emphasized the importance of cultural and sports exchanges and participation in the 8th China-Russia EXPO.
Russia and China signed an agreement on the joint development of Bolshoy Ussuriysky Island. The ceremony of signing the project concept took place in Beijing in the presence of Russian President Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping.
Political Repressions:
Authorities feel threatened by supporters of former Khabarovsk Krai Governor Furgal, and repressions against them have intensified.
Two emergencies occurred in the Amur region:
- 13 miners were trapped in a mine for several days.
- In Blagoveshchensk, a fruit kiosk was set on fire on national grounds after the terrorist attack in «Crocus.» The mayor hinted at a connection to Ukraine.
Since late April, significant disruptions in the supply of social products, including cereals, tea, and pasta, have been noticed in Vladivostok.
The trial continues against American citizen Gordon Black, allegedly arrested for theft, who is held in SIZO-1 in Vladivostok.
Republic of Buryatia
Putin’s appointee, head of the republic Alexey Tsydenov, confidently controls the situation in the republic. During the monitoring period, a relative manifestation of opposition was the support by a significant part of the political community of the appeal to protect the detained and detained former head of the People’s Hural (local parliament) Tsiren-Dashi Dorzhiev, who was taken into custody for two months under Art. 159 Part 4 of the Criminal Code «Fraud,» accused of stealing 36 million rubles during the construction of the Sosnovo-Ozerskaya School No. 1 in conspiracy with a group of people.
On Tsydenov’s initiative, the Hural abolished direct mayoral elections in Ulan-Ude. Now the mayor will be appointed. Potential separatism is one of the main threats to central authority stability in Buryatia. On April 26, 2024, the head of the Federal Agency for Nationalities Affairs of the Russian Federation Abdulhamid Bulatov stated that nationalist and separatist propaganda in Buryatia had increased a thousandfold since the war began.
On April 28, the public council for the 300th anniversary of Kyakhta confirmed the return to the city’s dual name Kyakhta-Troitskosavsk. The colonial name of the city from the times has been returned.
Late spring and early summer saw widespread fires in Buryatia. Mobilization is intensifying, with many reports from the Selenga region. Approximately 7.4% of Buryats aged 18 to 49 have been mobilized for the war in Ukraine (the national average is 2%). At least 1,493 verified Buryats have been confirmed killed in the war in Ukraine.
Tuva
Tuva is a laggard in Russia regarding socio-economic development, leading in criminal offenses and the number of men involved in the war in Ukraine.
The region has always been under the influence of former Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, a Tuvan. After his resignation, a struggle began between the clan of the current head of the republic, Vladislav Khavalig, and the former head, now Deputy Speaker of the State Duma, Sholban Kara-ool. The latter publicly accused threats against his proteges — participants in the war in Ukraine who participated in the so-called «primaries» for the local parliament from «United Russia» by «young men in suits.» In response, «United Russia» accused the deputy speaker of spreading fakes about the party’s primaries. This conflict highlighted the weakening positions of Shoigu’s people and the Kremlin’s support for the current head of Tuva, Khavalig (a protege of Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration Sergey Kiriyenko).
Due to the war in Ukraine, over a thousand children in Tuva have lost their fathers. As of June 2024, more than 500 Tuvans have been confirmed dead in the war (according to «Niva Tuva» publication).
According to the «Demography Has Fallen» study, Tuva leads in the number of men involved in the war — 9.3%.
In May, journalist Alla Dongur-ool was arrested in Tuva. The 69-year-old journalist systematically criticized the current government of Tuva. Under the previous leadership, she was already imprisoned for criticizing the authorities.
D) Central Regions
Central – Moscow and Region
The main conflict situation in the region is the persecution of representatives from Central Asia following the terrorist attack in «Crocus City Hall.» As a consequence, «people’s militias» have formed for vigilante justice against migrants, leading to mass arrests and raids in places where they gather. The actions of Russian security forces have worsened relations between Russia and Tajikistan and other Central Asian states. The rising discrimination also affects the overall Muslim population of the capital region.
Karelia
The Russian Ministry of Defense has deployed «Iskander» missiles in Karelia, justifying it as a response to Finland’s accession to NATO.
The region is home to the Sandarmokh memorial, where notable figures of the Ukrainian social movement of the 1920s-30s were executed. However, as expected, the memorial is in a neglected state. The Russian authorities aim to erase the memory of Stalinist terror.
In May, a conflict arose in the village of Panozero between the authorities and the population due to the decision to close the only school. Despite unanimous protests from parents, officials announced that the decision was final. Instead, students were offered to transfer to the Kem boarding school, which, according to parents, is hundreds of kilometers away from the village.
Saint Petersburg and Leningrad Region
On one hand, it is impossible to claim the presence of any centrifugal and federalist tendencies in Saint Petersburg today. On the contrary, most news demonstrates the local elites and citizens of Saint Petersburg following the central course. On the other hand, attention should be paid to existing conflict situations, especially in the national sphere, affecting the intensification of interethnic and interethnic conflicts in Saint Petersburg as the second center of the Russian Federation.
For instance, in Saint Petersburg, teenagers from Uzbekistan beat a man in the San Galli garden on Ligovsky Prospekt for no reason. The victim died on the spot. The case was reclassified as «hooliganism» because the man did not die from the beatings but from a heart attack.
Eastern Slobozhanshchyna
Despite the fact that election fraud did not meet with widespread resistance from the population, there are instances of disrupting the electoral process by pouring green dye into ballot boxes.
The transfer of hostilities to the territory of the aggressor country sharply affects the border regions. After the elections, the local media space is filled with news about shelling and clashes on the border with Ukraine. Any separatist or anti-war tendencies either come from the Ukrainian army and Russian volunteers or from the local population tired of the shelling.
The project is carried out in partnership with:
- The initiative «Anti-Imperial Bloc of Nations». Partner page: ABN pages and groups on Facebook, website: https://abn.org.ua.
- The public organization «Ukrainian Student».
- The non-governmental analytical center «Ukrainian Studies of Strategic Disquisitions» will conduct a series of research projects in 2024 on the collapse of Russia and the national interests of Ukraine in the world — see more on our resources https://linktr.ee/nac.ussd/.
We invite interested experts and organizations to join the partnership.
Author Team First Half of 2024
Yuriy Syrotiuk
Yuriy Oliynyk
Mykhailo Kublii
Mykola Volhov
Mykhailo Aleksandrov
Andriy Mykhailychenko
Karyna Konyayeva
Olga Yakovets
Anatoliy Maksymov
Daria Shapoval
Iryna Yevdochenko
Yaroslav Nitsoy
Mykhailo Tsyrulnyk
Ivan Yaniuk
Olena Makovetska
Marta Kolesnik
Yulia Gryshyna
Anna Nedashkivska
English translation by Oleksandr Chupak
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