The independent analytical center “Ukrainian Studies of Strategic Research” continues its long-term project of monitoring regional processes in Russia.
Objective of the Study
The goal of this research is to track and analyze the dynamics of conflict-prone and disintegration factors that contribute to the deconstruction of the Russian Federation and its disappearance as a geopolitical entity.
The monitoring focuses on Russia’s information space, analyzing the most popular news from various regions over a quarter. This approach provides a relatively clear picture of internal processes within the aggressor state and enables the identification of conflict-prone regional trends.
Regional Processes in Russia: September/November 2024
During this period, so-called pseudo-elections were held in many Russian regions, triggering a new wave of repression and persecution of dissenters. Local self-government bodies have effectively transformed into recruitment centers, with their primary task being to replenish the ranks of the occupation army. Often, recruitment targets socially vulnerable groups, for whom the Kremlin’s promised compensation appears sufficient to risk their health—or even their lives—in Russia’s aggressive war against Ukraine.
Regional Monitoring
1. Karelia
The issue of the Karelian language has escalated in the republic. While neighboring Finland has recognized it as a national minority language for 15 years, the authorities of Russia’s Karelian Autonomous Republic refuse to even discuss the matter. This issue was reignited at the end of November during celebrations in Finland.
Environmental concerns remain a significant regional problem, including access to clean water and the construction of protected areas. Protests against these developments often unite people based on national identity. For instance, the Vepsians successfully defended the Sheltosero nature reserve. Despite local authorities actively blocking any national initiatives of this small ethnic group, its members continue to show unity and national consciousness in protecting their land’s ecology from Moscow’s encroachments.
2. Siberia
Infrastructure issues pose a significant destabilization factor in the region. Several Siberian cities face severe problems with energy supply and, crucially, the heating system.
Additionally, small-scale protests took place in Siberian cities in defense of free speech and to commemorate victims of political repression, despite repeated intimidation attempts by authorities.
However, the overall situation remains difficult. The government suppresses any dissent. The culmination of these efforts was the revocation of parliamentary mandates from individuals labeled as “foreign agents” in Tomsk and Novosibirsk. This move effectively eliminates even the illusion of opposition participation in legal political processes. Meanwhile, local self-government is primarily focused on recruiting individuals into the occupation army.
3. Yakutia (Sakha)
Following the pseudo-elections in September, the Moscow-appointed local authorities of Yakutia intensified their efforts to replenish the Russian imperial army. The primary target for recruitment has become the homeless, who are subjected to mass round-ups and coerced into signing contracts before being sent to the “special military operation” zone. Each such operation can result in up to twenty new recruits.
The occupation authorities in Yakutia publicly demonstrate their “care” for the families of those killed in the war against Ukraine. However, logistical challenges, such as the lack of bridges in the region, frequently delay even the delivery of fallen soldiers’ bodies to their families. Years ago, the governor of the republic promised to eat his own tie if he failed to resolve the region’s transport issues—but he has yet to fulfill that promise.
4. Moscow Republic
Throughout autumn, government repression against public and political life continued, intensifying after the September “elections.” The lists of terrorists, extremists, and foreign agents have expanded to include journalists and poets who spoke out against the war.
Among the few positive developments were protest actions held in Moscow to mark the anniversary of the White House shooting, honor deceased activists, and commemorate victims of repression.
Fear of Ukrainian special services has led the Kremlin to increase pressure on the population under the pretext of combating “fake news about the army.” One of the most high-profile cases in this period was the arrest of pediatrician Nadezhda Buyanova for allegedly “discrediting the army”—though the case was based on a simple denunciation.
The number of prosecutions for treason continues to rise. Throughout the fall and December, Russia’s economy and security situation remain its most vulnerable points. No significant socio-political movements toward the separatism of the Moscow Republic have been observed. Forms of resistance remain ineffective, as even detained activists urge their peers to avoid protests and focus on self-preservation, further emboldening security forces and prosecutors while strengthening the role of informants and pressure from “patriots.”
5. Kuban and the Caucasus
In the fall of 2024, Kuban saw an intensified government campaign targeting the minds of teenagers and young people under the guise of fighting extremism in youth circles. This suggests several key points:
- The official ideology fails to meet the worldview needs of the target audience, prompting a search for alternatives to Kremlin narratives.
- Online platforms, messengers, and other digital spaces serve as fertile ground for spreading anti-Moscow ideas, which the occupation authorities have yet to fully control.
- Preventative measures now involve not only security forces and government institutions but also Kremlin-affiliated public organizations designed to promote a unified Russian identity and further Russify the indigenous peoples of the Caucasus.
This situation presents an opportunity for Ukraine to support and develop alternative youth leaders, ranging from radical to moderate, who can disseminate anti-imperial narratives among young audiences in Kabardino-Balkaria. These messages should also be conveyed in the languages of local ethnic groups, including the Balkars, Kabardians, and Terek Cossacks.
List of Authors
Ivan Yaniuk
Mykola Volhov
Marta Kolesnik
Andriy Mykhailichenko
Daria Shapoval
Моніторинг регіональних процесів у рф / вересень-листопад 2024 року:
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