The non-governmental analytical center Ukrainian Studies of Strategic Disquisitions continues its long-term project of monitoring regional processes in the Russian Federation.
The aim of the study is to record and identify the dynamics of conflictogenic and disintegration factors that will contribute to the deconstruction of the Russian Federation and its disappearance as a geopolitical reality.
The object of monitoring is the information space of the Russian Federation; the most popular news from various Russian regions is analyzed quarterly, which provides a more or less clear picture of the internal processes taking place on the territory of the aggressor state and allows for monitoring conflictogenic regional processes.
Monitoring of Regional Processes in the Russian Federation: Spring 2025
In the specified period, many regions experienced problems with infrastructure for which winter traditionally came unexpectedly. In regions close to Ukraine, the “arrival of the war” into everyday life became obvious. Across Russia, there is a worsening socio-economic situation, and in some regions, conflicts on national and religious grounds are intensifying.
CENTRAL REGION
Moscow Region
The situation in the region during the spring period is marked by the intensification of authoritarian practices, socio-humanitarian degradation, and environmental discontent — all of which lay the groundwork for potential destabilization. Heightened pressure on independent media, the blocking of Amnesty International, expansion of the “foreign agent” status, and systemic repression of political prisoners point to an attempt to completely eliminate the legal space for opposition.
Socio-economic tensions are rising due to the deepening demographic crisis, sanctions pressure, and conflicts between state propaganda and the interests of youth, students, and small businesses. Particular dissatisfaction is caused by the militarization of education and restrictions on migrants.
The religious sphere is also becoming militarized — the church is turning into a tool of political propaganda. A hostile campaign against Catholics and Greek Catholics is gaining momentum.
Environmental issues are emerging as a new source of public resistance: protests against the mass culling of animals, activist raids in Moscow, spontaneous public gatherings near administrative buildings, and conflicts over the development of green areas. This is one of the few areas that unites broad segments of the population — even those who are not politically active.
All of this contributes to a growing reservoir of protest potential, which could be activated by an external or internal catalyst.
| Marker | March | April | May |
| Socio-political | -3 | -1 | -2 |
| Socio-economic | -1 | 0 | 0 |
| Religious | -2 | 0 | -1 |
| Humanitarian | 2 | 0 | 2 |
| Environmental | 2 | 1 | -1 |
| Military | 1 | 2 | 2 |
| National | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Bryansk Region
The situation in the Bryansk region reflects a classic combination of military, economic, and demographic tensions that create conditions for regional destabilization. Constant shelling from Ukraine (up to 102 drones at a time) not only damages infrastructure but also strikes symbolically important targets — including the home of well-known local propagandist Alexander Bolshunov’s family and defense industry enterprises. The region’s total losses — over 660 servicemen in the spring alone — are fueling war fatigue, especially among residents of border areas, where public complaints about the authorities are increasingly frequent on social media, despite ongoing censorship and blocking.
The demographic situation is critical: authorities are directly encouraging underage births, and starting September 1, a law banning “incitement to abortion” is being introduced. This provokes public resistance and deepens the divide between the state’s agenda and the actual needs of the population.
The economic situation is rapidly deteriorating. Prices for basic food products (potatoes +180%, cabbage +58%) and utilities (+10%) are rising amid high inflation (10.89%), which locals believe is underreported. Fuel price hikes and the forced transition of taxi drivers to domestically produced vehicles are further fueling public dissatisfaction.
| Marker | March | April | May |
| Socio-political | -1 | 0 | -2 |
| Socio-economic | -1 | -1 | -2 |
| Religious | 1 | 1 | 2 |
| Humanitarian | 1 | 1 | -1 |
| Environmental | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Military | -1 | -2 | -2 |
| National | -1 | -1 | 1 |
NATIONAL REGIONS OF THE EUROPEAN PART OF RUSSIA
Orenburg
The situation in the Orenburg region in the spring of 2025 demonstrates a chronic governance crisis, growing pockets of resistance, and attempts by Moscow to place the region under tighter control. The replacement of Governor Pasler with a “varangian” from occupied Donetsk — Yevgeny Sontsev — along with his high-profile PR actions (resolving the waste crisis, restoring facilities after floods) were intended to suppress protest sentiments through quick results. However, the complete renewal of the government and the lack of local roots for the new acting governor only deepened the sense of alienation from the authorities.
A series of corruption scandals has been recorded, and the activities of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation (headed by Bastrykin), with its intrusive interference in minor issues and overreaction to local problems (stray dog attacks, a closed school), are provoking irony and discontent. The FSB is becoming more active, persecuting even minor expressions of dissent (memes, swearing at police, criticizing the St. George ribbon, attempts to join the Ukrainian Armed Forces), indicating a rise in individual protest actions.
The war against Ukraine is having a double effect: on the one hand — drones, explosions, panic, forced mobilization; on the other — public support from part of the population, encouraged by Putin’s awards and tax benefits. Against this backdrop, the regional system is being held together, but cracks are already visible — both social (garbage accumulation, rats, a failing dam) and political (explosions, individual radical acts).
| Marker | March | April | May |
| Socio-political | 0 | -1 | 2 |
| Socio-economic | 2 | 0 | 0 |
| Religious | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Humanitarian | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Environmental | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Military | -2 | 0 | 1 |
| National | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Bashkortostan
The situation in Bashkortostan in the spring of 2025 is marked by a systemic escalation of social conflict, which is gradually taking on the characteristics of a prolonged crisis. Protest activity has intensified — with the “Sterlitamak, Breathe!” movement opposing the construction of a landfill, mass demonstrations in the Abezilovsky district against developments on the Kyrkty-Tau ridge (with up to 90% support in some villages), as well as isolated acts of defiance during public events, for example, clashes on May 9.
At the same time, a wave of political repression continues: prison sentences for bloggers, activists, religious figures, and even a financial purge through the liquidation of the last local bank. Corruption scandals (the arrests of officials from Birsk, Ufa, and the Ministry of Justice) and the resignation of the Minister of Internal Affairs further tarnish the image of both local and federal authorities.
Environmental issues are adding to the tension: pollution in Salavat, an explosion at a factory, floods, and road collapses all demonstrate the authorities’ inability to respond to crises. The war is also fueling growing discontent: neglect of veterans, denial of payments, redirection of resources to occupied territories, while thousands of local residents are dying.
Despite attempts by the authorities to promote themselves through cultural projects or education reforms, negativity toward the regime is increasing. The social preconditions for broader protests are already in place.
| Marker | March | April | May |
| Socio-political | 1 | -2 | 1 |
| Socio-economic | 3 | 0 | 2 |
| Religious | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Humanitarian | -1 | -2 | 0 |
| Environmental | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Military | 3 | 0 | -1 |
| National | 0 | 1 | 0 |
Chuvashia
The situation in Chuvashia in the spring of 2025 reflects deep everyday and moral discontent, which has not yet transformed into open protest activity but is gaining momentum through public dissatisfaction and distrust of the authorities. One of the main irritants has been utility tariffs — against a backdrop of no hot water, no heating, and poor service quality. Outrage on social media turned into public humiliation of the authorities, which forced them to prematurely end the heating season — without actually solving any of the underlying problems.
The military aspect of destabilization is expressed in the widespread dissatisfaction of so-called “veterans” of the war against Ukraine, particularly regarding non-payments, neglect, lack of assistance, and societal contempt. There is also a noted conflict between real veterans and fake figures promoted by the media for future political advancement. This is causing particular frustration even among military correspondents, who openly speak of a betrayal of the frontline soldiers’ interests.
Institutional distrust is being deepened by corruption scandals: the case of Ladykov Jr., who committed yet another fatal traffic accident, has become a focal point of public anger, especially due to his high-ranking background. Some officials, trying to escape accountability, are going to the front — using it as a kind of “indulgence.”
Against this backdrop, a muted but widespread dissatisfaction is forming, spreading both in online spaces and in kitchen-table conversations. The potential for local protests is on the verge of breaking out.
| Marker | March | April | May |
| Socio-political | -1 | 1 | 1 |
| Socio-economic | 1 | 2 | 1 |
| Religious | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Humanitarian | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| Environmental | 1 | 2 | 2 |
| Military | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| National | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Karelia
In Karelia, the main factor destabilizing the situation continues to be environmental issues. The region faces problems with drinking water, which are only growing over time. The authorities managed to temporarily suppress protests over illegal construction in recreational areas, but these protests are likely to intensify again in the future.
The negative economic situation has a significant impact on public sentiment. Inflation in the region is breaking all possible records, yet the authorities tirelessly claim that the situation remains under control. There were already precedents of localities going “bankrupt” during the winter. With the situation deteriorating, this could happen again. If, in the cold season, the regional authorities fail to properly prepare for winter and this affects municipal infrastructure, it could trigger a serious crisis.
At the same time, the authorities are trying to distract the population with chauvinistic propaganda, which is unfolding against the backdrop of the militarization of the region.
The national movement has mostly been driven underground and manifests itself only through activities abroad, carried out in the form of cultural events or information campaigns; for example, in Kyiv, a memorandum of cooperation was signed between Karelian and Ukrainian nationalists. Meanwhile, the pro-Moscow occupation authorities of Karelia have signed a memorandum of cooperation with the terrorist organization known as the DPR.
| Marker | March | April | May |
| Socio-political | -2 | -1 | -1 |
| Socio-economic | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| Religious | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Humanitarian | 1 | 0 | 2 |
| Environmental | 3 | 2 | 2 |
| Military | 1 | 2 | 1 |
| National | 2 | 1 | 2 |
SOUTH
Dagestan
The overall system of local governance is becoming destabilized.
In Dagestan, there has been a noticeable intensification of repressions, with ongoing trials related to previous incidents, including persecution by the occupiers for alleged participation in actions against the Russian Federation during the Chechen wars. At the same time, there is a clear trend toward destabilization — with regular direct shootouts involving “extremists.” The fight against extremism is pushing the authorities to reckless measures, such as the inspection of women wearing niqabs, which may provoke resistance from radical Islamists and only further destabilize an already tense region.
Another significant destabilizing factor could be, on the one hand, the continued mobilization of the population for the aggressive war against Ukraine, and on the other hand, the issue of compensation for so-called “SMO veterans.”
Land conflicts are also escalating against a backdrop of national tensions and the lobbying efforts of “SMO veterans” (particularly in the Aukh district, bordering Chechnya). Often these so-called veterans of a war that is unwanted in the region compete for land plots with large families, further discrediting the war in the eyes of locals and potentially igniting a major conflict.
| Marker | April | May |
| Socio-political | +2 | -1 |
| Socio-economic | ||
| Religious | -1 | |
| Humanitarian | -2 | |
| Environmental | +3 | |
| Military | ||
| National | -2 |
Kuban
The occupation authorities are well aware of the risks associated with the activities of national movements of oppressed peoples and are undertaking preventive measures. Repressions are carried out against local activists, national community leaders, and religious groups. Governors appointed from Moscow, along with local collaborators, are working to weaken alternative foreign centers of influence in the region and to completely suppress local activism. This is done through intimidation of activists with fabricated extremism cases and through crackdowns on migration.
For Ukraine, the current situation in the region presents an opportunity in the context of ideological confrontation against Kremlin narratives in Arab countries. Official Kyiv can disseminate information about the repression of Muslims and ethnic groups who practice Islam in Russia. Publicizing these issues could deal a significant blow to the Kremlin’s image in the Arab world, which has traditionally responded strongly to any oppression of Muslims around the globe.
| Marker | March | April | May |
| Socio-political | 2 | 2 | 1 |
| Socio-economic | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Religious | 0 | 3 | 1 |
| Humanitarian | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| Environmental | 2 | 2 | 0 |
| Military | -1 | -1 | -1 |
| National | 0 | 3 | 2 |
FAR EAST
Kamchatka
Monitoring of local media and other sources indicates a growing accumulation of critical problems in the region’s humanitarian, economic, environmental, and socio-political spheres. One of the key indicators of destabilization is the worsening access to basic medical services, including shortages of medicines in rural pharmacies and cases where discounted medications are provided only after personal appeals to the authorities.
The economic situation has deteriorated: the collapse of the mortgage sector, strikes over wage arrears (16 million rubles), and the suspension of public transport in Vilyuchinsk. Social tension is rising against the backdrop of high prices and restrictions on locals’ access to their own resources (for example, caviar).
Infrastructure collapse is also evident: flooding and destroyed roads, dismissals of officials linked to corruption in the road sector.
Political repression continues: the arrest of the “Yabloko” party leader for an online comment, and pressure on dissenters. The authorities are actively redirecting public attention to military topics (FSB raids, patriotic games) and xenophobic campaigns (targeting migrants and mosques).
The crime situation is worsening due to alcoholism and drug-related crime among military personnel. An ecological disaster (oil spills, predatory fishing) is encouraging contact between wildlife and humans.
| Marker | March | April | May |
| Humanitarian | 1 | 2 | 1 |
| Environmental | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| National | -1 | -2 | 0 |
| Criminogenic | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Religious | 1 | -1 | 0 |
| «SMO» | -1 | -2 | -1 |
| Socio-economic | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Socio-political | -1 | 1 | 1 |
Sakhalin
The situation in the region during the spring of 2025 demonstrates systemic governance failures, critical infrastructure degradation, and the strengthening of authoritarian practices. Despite its energy potential, Sakhalin ranks second in Russia for the highest gasoline prices, which has caused social tension and transportation restrictions. A fire at an oil refinery, massive oil spills, 120 recorded fires, and pollution of the water area indicate a regional-scale environmental disaster.
Infrastructure problems have become especially noticeable: road collapses, railway stoppages, ferry queues lasting over a month, and detected defects on airport runways. Humanitarian conditions are worsening — rats are attacking residential areas, food prices are rising, communication outages are recorded, and chocolate prices reach 2,000 rubles per kilogram.
The socio-political situation is unstable: increased control over migrants, xenophobic raids, and the involvement of children in militaristic performances. Against this backdrop, the regional governor personally makes illegal visits to occupied territories, delivering equipment to the military. A high-profile case of voluntary surrender ended with a 15-year sentence. Crime rates in certain districts are rising, including serious crimes, which have increased by 12.1%.
The region increasingly shows signs of isolation: the General Prosecutor’s Office designates international organizations as undesirable, which only exacerbates tensions against the backdrop of geographic proximity to Japan and South Korea.
| Marker | March | April | May |
| Humanitarian | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| Environmental | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| National | -1 | -1 | 0 |
| Criminogenic | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| Religious | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| «SMO» | -1 | -2 | -1 |
| Socio-economic | 1 | 2 | 1 |
| Socio-political | -1 | -2 | 0 |
CONCLUSIONS
Spring 2025 demonstrated a deepening systemic socio-economic and demographic crisis across all regions of the Russian Federation. Inflation, unemployment, infrastructure degradation, and rising prices for basic services are creating an atmosphere of hopelessness, especially in the periphery. Demographic depletion is compounded by coercive mobilization practices primarily targeting socially vulnerable groups — prisoners, low-income populations, and residents of depressed regions. Despite financial incentives, the number of those willing to fight is steadily declining.
The rising death toll, neglect of veterans, unpaid compensations, and discrimination against war participants are increasingly demoralizing both society and the military. Against this backdrop, the authorities resort to targeted repressions, propaganda campaigns, and mobilization through fear — but these measures are insufficient to neutralize the growing protest sentiments.
In the regions bordering Ukraine (notably Bryansk), drone strikes against military and symbolic targets are creating an atmosphere of instability. National republics (such as Bashkortostan) are demonstrating not only dissatisfaction but organized opposition, including through environmental and ethnic protests.
Currently, the authorities still manage to contain the situation in the center through the repressive apparatus, information censorship, and the cult of “war as a unifying force.” However, this mechanism is worn out. Under the current conditions, only a single strong impulse is enough for the smoldering unrest to turn into an open crisis.
The monitoring was conducted by:
Yuriy Syrotiuk
Yuriy Oliynyk
Mykola Volhov
Ivan Yaniuk
Andriy Kovaliov
Yuliia Dolya
Andriy Mykhailychenko
Oleksii Tkachenko
Armais Ohanyan
English translation by Oleksandr Chupak