Global security, political, and economic trends and their impact on Ukraine in 2024

Forecast by the Non-Governmental Analytical Center “Ukrainian Studies of Strategic Disquisitions”

The research of the Non-Governmental Analytical Center “Ukrainian Studies of Strategic Disquisitions” aims to develop a forecast of global trends in the world and their influence on the situation in Ukraine throughout 2024. The forecast includes an analysis of current trends and recommendations for the behavior of political actors.

First, we analyze the realization level of our previous forecast for the year 2023. Then, there is an overview of global security and economic trends, followed by an investigation of processes in key regions of the world. Special attention is given to the situation in Russia as a military-political adversary of Ukraine. Based on global trends, the NGO “USSD” analyzes internal and external risks to the sovereignty and stability of Ukraine during 2024.

 Глобальні безпекові, політичні, економічні тенденції у світі та їхній вплив на Україну в 2024 році : https://ussd.org.ua/2024/01/18/globalni-bezpekovi-politychni-ekonomichni-tendencziyi-u-sviti-ta-yihnij-vplyv-na-ukrayinu-v-2024-roczi/

1. Realization of the forecast for 2023

Forecast 2023Result
Economy
The pace of economic growth in the United States at the end of 2023 will increase.Forecast realized. The growth rate increased slightly: from 2.1% in 2022 to 2.4% in 2023. Issues with consumer inflation and high interest rates persist. President Biden’s low ratings are primarily associated with the economic situation.
The growth rate of the European Union will continue to decline.Forecast realized. GDP growth decreased from 3.4% in 2022 to 0.8% in 2023. Germany, in particular, suffered, falling into recession due to catastrophic energy policies and issues with its largest external partner, China.
In 2023, we expect further weakening of China compared to other global leaders.Forecast realized. 2023 definitively shattered China’s dreams of being the world’s largest economy. Supply chain issues, demographics, and a decline in industrial production raised concerns globally.
Throughout the year, we expect continued economic decline in Russia across all indicators, but this will not be the main driver of Russia’s defeat.Forecast partially realized. Occupiers did not experience an economic collapse, but their economy is affected by several factors: excessive focus on the defense sector, workforce reduction through mobilization and emigration, shortage of imported goods, especially high-tech ones.
Assuming successful defense by Ukraine against Russian occupiers, we expect the beginning of the process of restoring the Ukrainian economy in 2023.Forecast realized. After a 29% GDP loss in 2022, the Ukrainian economy grew by 3-4% in 2023.
Political Processes
The Russian-Ukrainian war will continue and continue to have a serious impact on global politics and the economy.Forecast realized.
In 2023, India, Brazil, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia will refrain from a clear choice, maneuvering, benefiting from cooperation with both sides and increasing their weight in the world. We expect India to approach the U.S.; meanwhile, China is likely to continue slowly distancing itself from Moscow’s aggression. However, there are certain limits, as Beijing feels threatened by the AUCUS bloc. The likelihood of China attacking Taiwan is low, as is Belarus engaging in full-scale combat with Ukraine.Overall, the forecast realized, especially in light of the increasing peace initiatives from China and Global South players.
The Kremlin will gradually lose control over the power structures, “Wagner,” battalions of individual republics, and regions.Forecast realized in the form of Prigozhin’s coup attempt and the increasing internal political significance of Kadyrov.
One possible forecast, although of medium probability, is the removal of Putin and Prigozhin. The struggle against Kadyrov by old elites concerned about their own lives will unfold. If successful, they are likely to opt for peace, and troop withdrawal, but this will preserve Russia for the next decade, when everything may repeat.Forecast not fully realized, but trends exist as some players increasingly publicly assert their subjectivity. Even after Prigozhin’s failed attempt, the Kremlin failed to reconcile the overall state hierarchy, and Kadyrov continued to pursue semi-autonomous internal policies. Meanwhile, low-ranking groups, likely to support Prigozhin, may resort to more decisive actions during the presidential elections in Russia.
The most critical problems for Moscow are likely in the Caucasus, particularly in Dagestan, where occupiers are increasingly gaining police control, conducting repression against dissenting religious groups within Islam. Now they are taking away a significant portion of the youth from the republic to the front, contributing to protests, especially erupting in September.Forecast realized through the increase in popular uprisings, culminating in the events of October 2023, provoked by outrage over events in the Gaza sector.
There are currently no signals of reaching fundamental agreements in Karabakh between the parties. As long as Moscow is present in the settlement process and political configurations, the conflict will be preserved to some extent. However, Moscow’s weakening will encourage Armenia to pursue a more constructive policy, leading to possible peaceful breakthroughs.Forecast partially realized, after Baku’s definitive restoration of sovereignty over Karabakh.
Possible escalation on the border of Afghanistan with Central Asian states, primarily Tajikistan.Forecast did not materialize in a hot form.
China will continue to slowly distance itself from Russia, but expecting an actively pro-Ukrainian position is not advisable.Forecast realized in the form of peaceful initiatives starting from March 2023.
Possible coup attempts in other Sahel states, some of which will be supported by Russian agents.Forecast realized, with coups in Nigeria and Gabon.

2. Economic Forecast for 2024

Economic Trends in 2024: Cautious Recovery, Aid Challenges

Ukraine

The new year 2024 comes to Ukraine under familiar conditions of uncertainty. On one hand, the full-scale war daily poses a threat of destabilization for the entire country in all aspects of its existence. On the other hand, there is an increasing risk of reduced external assistance, upon which Ukraine’s viability, according to the State Budget Law, depends by at least half.

However, the Ukrainian economy concludes 2023 much better than expected twelve months ago. The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is expected to grow by around 5% at the end of 2023, and inflation in November slowed to 5.1% on an annual basis. It can be said that in 2022 we rebounded from the bottom, losing 29% of GDP, and now we are starting a cautious recovery.

If positive trends persist, we can expect a growth of 4-6% in 2024, according to the International Monetary Fund. The main factors positively influencing the Ukrainian economy are as follows:

  1. Success on the battlefield. Ukrainian defense forces prevent occupiers from capturing new territories, allowing Ukrainians to plan their economic life.
  2. Business adaptability. Ukrainian entrepreneurs quickly adapt to challenging circumstances, organizing their activities where they are forced to relocate.
  3. Uninterrupted electricity supply. Compared to the previous year, businesses are not forced to interrupt their work daily due to lack of electricity.
  4. High agricultural sector productivity. Agricultural products lead the structure of Ukrainian exports, and self-sufficiency in the market with their own products has become a major factor in reducing consumer inflation.
  5. Exchange rate stability. Thanks to a high level of National Bank reserves, the hryvnia exchange rate is kept within the forecasted range.

The main threat in 2024 is the mentioned reduction in external financing. The budget deficit is planned at over $40 billion per year or over $3 billion per month. Currently, Ukrainian officials express concern about the further provision of assistance, especially due to the delay in the promised €50 billion from the European Union and $60 billion from the United States. However, we hope that by the end of winter, these funds will be allocated, and we won’t have to cut pensions and public sector salaries.

An extremely unpleasant negative factor that may affect us in 2024 is the blocking of cargo transportation at the western border. Through this blockade, Ukraine lost at least 7% or about $1.3 billion in exports of agricultural products. The blockades started at a time when we finally began to solve the problem with the maritime corridor, establishing routes through the waters of Romania and Bulgaria, and destroying the Russian fleet. Removing blockades at the beginning of 2024 is one of the priorities for the Ukrainian government.

Of course, active combat actions, shelling of cities, and economic facilities exert the most pressure on our economy. Currently, the state makes macroeconomic forecasts assuming that the war will continue throughout 2024 with unchanged intensity. A significant challenge for the economy in case of an intensification of the war may be in 2025, at the beginning of which there may be a change of power in the United States. If Americans change their policy towards Ukraine by reducing aid, EU countries may follow their example.

Thus, economic trends in Ukraine largely coincide with the military ones. While receiving insufficient military aid, we successfully resist the aggressor. Similarly, in the economy, we implement optimistic forecasts without the minimum required level of financial support. Therefore, in 2024, our partners need to seriously consider how much they do not want the Russian occupier to encroach on their lands in the future.

World

In 2024, global economic trends related to recovery from the coronavirus pandemic and global geopolitical shocks will continue. The largest countries will seek to restore high growth rates while simultaneously combating inflation and feeling the consequences of rising interest rates.

The resilience of the United States after the 2020 crisis proved stronger than in other Western countries. In 2023, the US GDP grew by approximately 2.4%, although far from the economic boom during Donald Trump’s time. The Biden administration managed to overcome a 40-year high in inflation, but US citizens are still dissatisfied with the rapid rise in prices. The situation for the population worsens with the regular raising of rates by the Federal Reserve, resulting in more expensive credit. According to various polls, only about 35% of Americans approve of Biden’s economic policy, making the welfare issue the most painful for Washington ahead of the November elections. GDP growth in 2024 is projected to be around 2-2.3%.

In 2024, Europe will continue to pay the price for close cooperation with Russia over the past decades. The GDP growth of the Eurozone in 2023, only 0.8%, underscored the problems of European leaders, especially Germany and France. Germans earned the nickname “Sick Man of Europe” last year due to their dismal economic situation, linked to both the complicated rejection of Russian energy carriers and close trade ties with crisis-ridden China. Eurozone is expected to grow by 1.6% in 2024, but these growth rates are far from what Brussels aspires to see.

The situation for the British economy is even worse. Political crisis, constant changes in the government, unfavorable conditions in global markets, and other factors have led to the UK’s GDP growth of only 0.6% in 2023, projected to grow by 0.5% in 2024 (compared to 3.9% in 2022). Economic troubles may lead to a change of power in London: elections are expected no later than January 2025. The Conservative Party is currently significantly behind in most polls compared to the Labour Party.

China no longer dares to set ambitious economic growth targets within the range of 8-10% of GDP. Instead, Xi Jinping and company aim for a more realistic 5%, although the accuracy of Chinese statistics always raises doubts. During 2022-2023, some economists began to sound the alarm, suggesting that the crisis in China could be so deep that it would affect the rest of the world. Catastrophe has not happened yet, but Beijing faces obvious problems: an aging population, falling birth rates, declining labor productivity, etc. To restore growth rates, more freedom needs to be given to businesses, but in 2024, Chinese communists may not be ready for this.

The Russian economy in 2024 will continue its massive shift to a war economy: defense spending will increase by 70% to 6% of GDP. Despite the impact of sanctions, Moscow receives enough income from the sale of energy carriers, allowing it to finance the war and maintain a satisfactory level of welfare for its citizens. According to various estimates, the war costs Putin approximately $100 billion per year – it is challenging to sustain such expenditure levels for an extended period while mobilizing hundreds of thousands of able-bodied citizens. A country with an unhealthy demographic situation, widespread corruption, and under the influence of harsh sanctions cannot exist for a long time without visible economic troubles. Russia’s GDP growth in 2024 will be maintained at 1.1% (compared to 1.2% in 2023), but the investment structure has already radically shifted towards the military-industrial complex. This means that Russia is rapidly turning into a USSR model after the Second World War when the well-being of the population was sacrificed for the goals of the arms race.

The main influencing factors on the global economy in 2024 will include:

  1. Geopolitical processes: The Russian-Ukrainian war, tensions in the Middle East, piracy in the Red Sea, etc., will cause a shift in global supply chains.
  2. Change in political elites: In 2024, there will be over 70 elections in countries with a total population of 4.2 billion people. In particular, a change in power in the US and the EU can significantly impact the economic policies of major global players.
  3. Change in the world’s energy map: While the West continues to waste hundreds of billions on unprofitable “green” energy, the world will suffer from OPEC and Russia dictating energy prices.

3. Global Political Processes

The Russian-Ukrainian war will continue, continuing to have a significant impact on global politics and the economy. The formation of a bipolar world will pose questions for several countries regarding alignment with one of the power centers. In 2024, India, Brazil, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia will refrain from a clear choice, maneuvering, benefiting from cooperation with both sides and increasing their influence in the world. We expect closer ties between India and the USA; meanwhile, China is likely to slowly distance itself from Moscow’s aggression. However, there are certain limits, as Beijing feels threatened by the AUCUS alliance. The likelihood of China attacking Taiwan is low, as is Belarus engaging in full-scale military actions with Ukraine.

China will seek to expand support in the Global South, promoting the expansion of the informal BRICS platform.

Almost half of the world’s population will go to the polls this year – presidents and parliaments will be elected in more than 50 countries.

Presidents will be elected in the United States and appointed in Russia this year. The European Union’s 27 countries will elect a new European Parliament. Concurrently, elections for presidents or parliaments will take place in individual EU countries – Austria, Belgium, Lithuania, Slovakia, Portugal, Romania, Croatia, and Finland.

Elections will occur in India, Indonesia, Mexico, and South Korea. Allies of Russia in Iran will reappoint the government.

For Russia, elections in other countries are a way of global external aggression, a method to sow chaos, fuel internal conflicts in countries, and use democratic instruments, including freedom of the press and expression, to wage war through political means. At the same time, in 2024, elections will take place in a key military ally of Russia, Iran, and in Russia itself.

The threat of famine in poor countries has decreased due to exports from Ukraine and the weakening of the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation, which is no longer capable of fully blocking ports. However, the supply level on the market is still insufficient, and the rise in prices for food and fertilizers will destabilize the situation in certain regions, especially in the Middle East and Africa. In the West, there should be expectations of new attempts at military coups in the area of former French influence.

Ukraine

As both sides lack resources and means, a crucial element in the long war is maintaining diplomatic and military-political support:

  • For Ukraine – the United States, NATO, the United Kingdom, Poland, and the Baltic countries.
  • For Russia – forming conditions for an anti-American coalition because Russia can no longer produce enough necessary equipment (especially regarding drones and precision missile weapons).

Against the backdrop of the prolonged conflict, Russia is preparing for a massive wave of mobilization. According to Western estimates, training grounds can accommodate up to 600 thousand recruits. However, large-scale and rapid offensive actions for Russia are currently minimal. Ukrainian actions depend to a large extent on the dynamics of supplies from partners, including aviation. Most likely, the dominant feature of 2024 remains a positional war of the First World War type.

The formation of a “strategic balance” situation on the front and Russia’s use of the tactic of meat attacks, leading to the bloodshed of both sides, forces both parties, especially Ukraine, to seek new tactical solutions to preserve manpower on the front lines. Particularly where the front has taken on static characteristics, the use of robotic and automated fire control and reconnaissance and attack UAV complexes capable of disrupting enemy assault operations, conducting reconnaissance, and destroying enemy positions on the front line without unnecessary risk to live forces.

Russia has lost a significant amount of military equipment, which may limit its ability to launch large-scale ground offensives. This may be one of the reasons why the Russian government and President Putin increasingly view this war as a long-term measure necessary for ensuring Russia’s security.

Negative trends are also growing in Ukraine, fueled by corruption scandals and disappointment in the seemingly ineffective counteroffensive. Moscow will continue to exploit these factors.

The main direction of Russia’s information-psychological operations aimed at weakening Ukrainian society will remain:

  • Dissemination of opinions and narratives in Ukraine and worldwide that Ukraine cannot win.
  • Provoking disappointment and mistrust among the population towards the Ukrainian government amid worsening socio-economic conditions.
  • Provoking political conflicts and, through them, discrediting the Ukrainian political class.

Therefore, critical for Ukraine’s victory is not only achieving success on the front, obtaining positive and noticeable results but also shifting the war to the enemy’s territory (primarily in the ideological-informational sphere). It is essential to exploit the exacerbation of socio-economic disparities between regions and national contradictions in Russia, supporting the national self-determination of non-Russian peoples.

The main challenge for Ukraine remains technical dependence on the supply of allies, not only high-tech ones (a domestic artillery ammunition plant should be built by next year).

On the other hand, successful solutions have been found in naval warfare, strengthening the possibility of significantly restricting Black Sea trade for the Russian Federation (primarily concerning grain and petroleum products, but also dual-use products under sanctions).

American support for Kyiv will be significantly influenced by discussions in Washington in the context of presidential elections. Europe will be forced to engage more in supporting Ukraine. In particular, the production of tank equipment in Ukraine with the participation of the German corporation “Rheinmetall” will continue.

4. The situation in Russia

The Kremlin is gradually losing control over the power structures, “Wagner” private military companies, battalions of individual republics, and regions. We expect another wave of mobilization after the presidential elections. There is a moderate probability of conflicts thawing in Abkhazia and Ossetia, as well as a crisis in Tajikistan on the border with Afghanistan, diverting the Kremlin’s attention.

Russian authorities experienced a significant legitimacy crisis during the “Wagner” PMC uprising, adding to the population’s war fatigue. However, there are no prerequisites for rapid revolutionary changes yet.

Resistance from subjugated peoples and Russians themselves against mobilization and the loss of lives will increase, but in the short term, we do not expect significant shifts in the political landscape of individual regions. Dissatisfaction with the regime gradually intensifies, manifesting in spontaneous, yet non-politicized movements. A notable example is the unrest in the Caucasus, especially in Dagestan, in October 2023, in the context of support for the Muslim sector of Gaza. We expect the wave of instability to gradually increase.

It is impossible to call the upcoming elections in Russia in March 2024 a transfer of power. The country lacks political freedoms, free press, and political competition. The political space has been completely cleared. It involves not only serious candidates opposing the war – even ultra-patriotic supporters of the war are forbidden from hindering Putin’s coronation, ruling longer than Stalin. However, the stick has two ends. Now the “king” bears sole responsibility for everything happening in Russia. The international community’s non-recognition of the elections and the order for the ISS arrest are just the first warning signs. One significant reason for the non-recognition of the elections is their conduct in the occupied territories of Ukraine.

Obviously, after the elections in the spring of 2024, Moscow will attempt to conduct a new wave of mobilization.

5. Regional Forecasts

a) Europe

From June 6 to June 9, 2024, over 400 million European voters will elect over 700 deputies for a five-year term. Russia’s task is to maximize support for eurosceptics and populists. Although the EU is expected to “correct” based on the trends of recent elections, the victory of populists is unrealistic, despite the success of eurosceptics in national elections in the Netherlands and Slovakia and the growth of their support in Austria and Germany.

Currently, polls indicate a preference for two main groups in the European Parliament: the center-right European People’s Party and the center-left Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats, which are expected to finish first, albeit with a smaller share of votes than now. The emergence of new partners for Orban in Europe, like Slovak Prime Minister and Smer-SD party leader Robert Fico, poses a greater threat. Currently, the highest growth in popularity of eurosceptics is observed in Austria – a country significantly influenced by Russian corrupt capital.

While the “Schroderization” of Europe (bribing key political players by Russia) is now practically political death for any European politician, Russia continues to try to influence the politics of some European countries through its gas and oil leverage.

The consensus principle of voting in the EU, as well as the destructive position of Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban, who may unexpectedly lead the European Council meeting on a rotational basis in July after the resignation of European Council President Charles Michel, could potentially complicate decision-making regarding aid to Ukraine. Therefore, EU countries are looking for ways to avoid such a scenario and, if necessary, deprive Hungary of the right to vote and receive European funds.

Russian invasion of Ukraine remains the most serious foreign policy threat for most countries in the region, especially for Poland, Romania, and the Baltic countries. Geographic proximity to Russia will continue to compel these countries to maintain at least a certain level of political support for Ukraine and take their defense capabilities more seriously. In this context, cooperation with the U.S. in the field of security and defense will be crucial.

In addition to the Russian threat, Poland, Lithuania, and Latvia will continue to face a hybrid Belarusian threat. In the new year, Lukashenko’s regime will continue to use migrants to create tension on the border with its western neighbors. A possible, albeit relatively unlikely, scenario is a gradual reduction in the intensity of attacks after parliamentary and local elections in Belarus, fitting into a broader framework of seeking common ground with Western neighbors, especially Poland, where a new government has taken office.

There is also a risk that anti-Ukrainian sentiments will grow in some countries in the region against the backdrop of economic problems, which certain politicians and part of the population will associate with the Russian-Ukrainian war. There is also a possibility of continued controversies over the export of Ukrainian grain and speculations related to support for Ukraine against the backdrop of local elections in Poland and presidential elections in Slovakia.

Hungary will remain the most problematic player that will not refrain from blocking EU initiatives aimed at helping Ukraine. In addition, official Budapest will maintain its role as a point of support for Russia, Belarus, and China. Regarding cooperation with the latter, some Central and Eastern European states will continue to review their relations with Beijing, potentially leading to the withdrawal of some players from the “14+1” cooperation format after the Baltic countries decided to withdraw from it.

In the context of geopolitical transformations and the emergence of new challenges that directly affect Central and Eastern Europe, there is a possibility of revitalizing cooperation attempts among the countries in the region, especially within existing formats. However, these initiatives will face obstacles due to differences in positions with Hungary and, possibly, Slovakia.

At the end of 2023, the Balkan region is entering a deeper crisis, and we may observe increased risks of a new conflict in the region. The potential risks are heightened with the involvement of the Kosovar authorities, who have expressed their intention to hold repeat elections in the north as a replacement for the boycotted ones in April.

b) United States

On November 5, 2024, the 60th presidential elections will take place in the United States. The U.S. will remain a politically divided country. The confrontation between Republicans and Democrats will escalate throughout the year as parties prepare for the 2024 presidential elections.

Russia’s main task in these elections is to immerse the U.S. in uncontrolled intense chaos of electoral warfare through a network of bots and paid influence agents, maximally highlighting and fueling political contradictions between the leading parties. Russia is already trying to undermine bipartisan support for Ukraine and eliminate the U.S.’s leadership role in countering Russian aggression in Ukraine. In the previous U.S. elections, Russia tested aggressive intervention technologies, particularly through bot networks on social media. Russia will also maximize the spotlight on the positions of left- and right-wing radical fringe elements in American politics calling for an end to military aid to Ukraine. Independent candidate Robert F. Kennedy Jr., who demanded an end to aid to Ukraine, is among the presidential candidates in this regard.

Of course, there will be a destructive information campaign by the well-known American blogger and journalist Tucker Carlson, who is officially employed by “Russia Today.”

Difficulties surrounding the presidential elections will pose a greater risk to internal processes, which may hinder the response to events around Russia-Ukraine and China-Taiwan. However, we expect further escalation in relations with Beijing, including trade wars, as conflicts have not been resolved despite the meeting between Biden and Xi Jinping in November 2023.

c) Latin America

Socialist governments will continue to hinder the development of the region, making it more vulnerable to external influences. Economic troubles will lead to a new wave of protests in 2024.

In South America, the new government of Argentina demands that Britain return sovereignty over the Falkland Islands, and Venezuela has announced a possible annexation of the disputed Guyana-Essequibo region, relying on the support of a referendum.

It is likely that the annexation of Essequibo will take place not only on paper but also by force within a few weeks or months. Guyana will not be able to offer significant resistance due to a significant difference in military potential between the parties.

Presidential elections in Mexico will take place in June 2024. For the first time, a woman may become the president of the country. The candidates are Claudia Sheinbaum from the ruling center-left party and businesswoman Sochitl Galves from the opposition coalition “Broad Front for Mexico.”

Until now, Mexico has sought to maintain neutrality in the Russia-Ukraine war. The country criticized excessive military aid from the U.S. to Ukraine but did not support Russia’s aggression and voted for important UN resolutions condemning Russia in the war. It seems that the election results will not significantly change Mexico’s approach to the Russia-Ukraine war.

d) Middle East

The attacks by Yemeni Houthi rebels on civilian ships in the Red Sea threaten the safety of global supply chains. Up to 20% of world trade has been transiting through the Red Sea until now.

In 2024, the Houthis and the official Yemeni government were supposed to reach a peaceful agreement, given the interest of supporting states. However, the peace process is now jeopardized by Houthi attacks on commercial ships in the Red Sea and the armed response from the United States and the United Kingdom.

The ongoing Palestinian-Israeli war continues to pose serious consequences for the world and the Middle East. It began with a terrorist attack by Hamas on Israel, escalated into a military operation by Israel in the Gaza Strip, and threatens to escalate into a global conflict between Israel and the Arab world.

Baku and Yerevan will engage in trade with clear advantages favoring the former. Meanwhile, Russia will focus on a change of power in Armenia and maintaining this country as its satellite. At the same time, Moscow will continue to reap dividends from friendly relations with Azerbaijan. Tehran will also seek to maximize benefits from cooperation with Yerevan and normalize relations with Baku. Simultaneously, Turkey will continue its expansion through Azerbaijan into Central Asian states.

Iran staunchly refuses to engage in negotiations regarding its nuclear program. A major war is an absolutely unacceptable scenario for Iran. Therefore, Iran will continue to avoid direct confrontation with Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the U.S., although proxy wars with these states are ongoing.

In May 2024, Iran will hold its first elections after mass protests in 2022 related to the death of Mahsa Amini. Given the electoral system and the precedent of disqualifying over 7,000 candidates (almost half of those intending to run) before the elections, it is practically impossible to change Iran’s position through elections. Although blatant suppression of any expression of political views may again push the country into mass protests.

The situation in Iraq will traditionally remain tense. Currently, Iraq can be defined as a fragile state or a failed state. Regional and global actors, including Saudi Arabia, Iran, Turkey, and the U.S., will have a significant impact on the country’s internal politics, reinforcing centrifugal tendencies.

In Syria, the escalation of conflict is not expected, but Turkey is capable of restraining Russian forces and reducing Assad’s influence in the region. Turkey’s increased influence in northern Syria will balance Assad’s dominant position in the center and the south of the country. Meanwhile, Israel, seeking to protect control over the occupied Golan Heights, constrains Assad. However, the situation may escalate between Israel and Palestine.

The battle in Gaza will continue for at least a few more months and is likely to end with full occupation and demilitarization of the sector. However, what comes next is unknown. The Netanyahu government rejects all attempts at international mediation, including the deployment of international forces to Gaza. Moreover, there are calls to completely evict Arabs from Gaza. However, where they would go remains a mystery since no Arab country has agreed to accept them. Ultimately, there will be peace talks, but Jerusalem does not want and does not plan to negotiate with Ramallah. So, how this war will end is currently an open question.

e) East Asia

Tension is rising in the Pacific region. The situation around Taiwan is traditionally complex ahead of the island’s elections. Of particular concern is the demonstration of a military threat and statements of readiness for war from North Korea.

Beijing will likely continue to play a mediator role between Russia and the West, indirectly supporting Russia and allowing North Korea to sell weapons to Moscow. China will gradually distance itself diplomatically from Russia, but a shift to an actively pro-Ukrainian position is not expected.

The situation in Myanmar will be dynamic as various ethnic rebel groups actively advance, and the Myanmar Armed Forces suffer defeats. China and India may intervene in the situation, as they are interested in security buffers along their borders.

In North Korea, the probable maintenance of the status quo with periodic security crises provoked by North Korea, such as island shelling, is expected by 2024. The development of nuclear and missile programs will continue, and cooperation with Russia, dependent on arms supplies from Pyongyang, will increase.

On January 13, elections will take place in Taiwan, and most likely, there will be a change in the president. Currently, Lai Ching-te from the Democratic Progressive Party is considered the favorite. He served as the premier of the self-proclaimed republic from 2017 to 2019. He is supported by the most radical nationalists. If he wins, China will continue to do everything to further provoke and isolate Taiwan.

China, while demonstrating its military strength near Taiwan, has used soft methods of influencing elections, including disinformation and economic incentives. It is likely that China will attempt a military solution to the Taiwan issue this year, but in the case of a military operation, events in the world will have an unpredictable character.

Japan will significantly increase defense spending and rearm in response to China’s military buildup.

f) Africa

On the border of the DR Congo and Rwanda, the risk of direct confrontation between states is growing. The military buildup in both countries, the absence of direct high-level dialogue, and the preservation of hate speech are alarming signs that could lead to a large-scale conflict. The influence of Russia, whose mercenaries have been spotted in eastern DR Congo, remains a threat.

On the western coast of the continent, we expect an increase in gas extraction, especially the intensification of the construction of highways from Angola and Nigeria to Europe—most likely along the Atlantic coast. This will weaken Russian-Chinese influence in oil and gas-exporting countries.

Rising prices for food and energy, coupled with high national debt, make the default of several countries in Black Africa likely. Instability is expected in South Africa due to an economic crisis and a loss of trust in the ruling party, the African National Congress, which may not win the elections.

The situation in West Africa remains traditionally tense, where Russia enhances instability, supporting military coups. The situation in Niger will remain a point of tension, with a pro-Moscow junta strengthening. Niger suffers from jihadist terrorist attacks and cannot secure itself independently, requiring external assistance. It can be predicted that Russia, feeling a security vacuum in Niger, will try to negotiate closer cooperation and involve the Wagner Private Military Company in the country. Mercenaries are already active in Mali, and there are suspicions of their involvement in Burkina Faso. Therefore, under the conditions of a full transition of Niger into the orbit of Russian political influence, Moscow’s position in the Sahel will significantly strengthen.

In Burkina Faso, the pro-Russian orientation of Ibrahim Traore will allow Russia to further strengthen its influence in the region, primarily through military cooperation.

The internal conflict in Sudan between the army and the “Janjaweed” militia has a destabilizing impact on the East African region, which is already unstable. Sudan is located in the strategic region of the Red Sea, one of the most important waterways in the world. For this reason, the country attracts special attention from the United States, Russia, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and the EU. We expect more involvement from neighboring states, especially Egypt. Further destabilizing activity of Russian mercenaries supporting “Janjaweed” is also anticipated.

In Ethiopia, relative stabilization is expected as the peace process between the central government and the elites of the Tigray state has been ongoing for the past year. Addis Ababa will more actively intervene in the affairs of neighboring Sudan and Somalia (where Ethiopia recently recognized the separatist government of “Somaliland”).

g) South Asia

Considering that Pakistan and India are gradually entering the campaign for parliamentary elections in February and April-May 2024, respectively, there should not be expected shifts in the negotiations on Jammu and Kashmir. However, taking into account the factor of the Russo-Ukrainian war, China’s presence in the region (Aksai Chin and the Shaksgam Valley), and the presence of nuclear weapons in both states, one should not anticipate a rapid intensification and escalation of the conflict.

In the parliamentary elections in India, the right-centrist coalition National Democratic Alliance, led by the incumbent Prime Minister Narendra Modi, competes with the left-centrists under the leadership of the former ruling Indian National Congress. Currently, the position of the incumbent government looks more convincing. Therefore, a sharp change in India’s position regarding Ukraine is not expected. The Indian government maintains an expectant position, trying to create an alliance with the West as a counterbalance to its main rival, China, while economically isolating Russia by buying from it.

In Afghanistan, we expect a gradual international recognition of the Taliban over the next few years. Regular bloody terrorist attacks will continue to occur in 2024.

In February, elections will take place in Indonesia, the regional leader of Southeast Asia and the country with the largest Muslim population in the world. For many years, the country has been subjected to the systematic work of Russian diplomacy and propaganda distorting the assessment of Russian aggression in Ukraine. Therefore, one of the main contenders for power, the current Minister of Defense Prabowo Subianto, in June 2023, came up with a strange peace plan for Ukraine, which proposed a referendum “on disputed territories.” Although pro-Russian narratives are actively spreading in Indonesia, and the country has not joined anti-Russian sanctions, it will continue to try to balance the interests of China (its largest trading partner) and the United States (a security ally).

Conclusion

The main focus of the world’s attention will remain on the Russo-Ukrainian war. Its outcomes will also influence China’s decisions on the Taiwan issue and its attempts at a military solution. The third theater of operations will become more active within the framework of global confrontation – in the Middle East and Africa. There will be further escalation of strategic confrontation between global players. Economically, the recovery of the economy is possible in specific sectors and regions, while the global system will continue to be in crisis. Within Ukraine, the threat of internal destabilization remains due to informational influence on the population and resistance to mobilization.

Yuriy Syrotyuk, Director of the Non-Governmental Analytical Center “Ukrainian Studies of Strategic Disquisitions,” People’s Deputy of Ukraine VII convocation, Junior Sergeant-Grenadier of the 5th Separate Assault Kyiv Brigade

Yuriy Oliynyk, Candidate of Political Sciences, Head of Research Programs at the Non-Governmental Analytical Center “Ukrainian Studies of Strategic Disquisitions”

Oleksandr Chupak, Head of Economic Programs at the Non-Governmental Analytical Center “Ukrainian Studies of Strategic Disquisitions”

Pavlo Rad, Analyst of the Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism”

Non-Governmental Analytical Center “Ukrainian Studies of Strategic Disquisitions”:

http://linktr.ee/nac.ussd

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published.